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RESPONSE ESSAYS
"IT'S SNOWING DOWN SOUTH": HOW TO HELP
MOTHERS AND AVOID RECYCLING THE SAMENESS/
DIFFERENCE DEBATE
Joan Williams*
Professor Williams argues that by understandingtheir historyfeminists
can avoid repeating it. The key disagreement in the destructive sameness!
difference debate is not over whether women are the same or different from
men, but over whether to empower women in their traditionalcaregivingrole
(the 'femme strategy"), or to shift them into socially valued masculine gender
performancessuch as melding personal identity with paid work and off-loading care work (the "tomboy strategy"). Professor Williams argues that, given
the profound importance of care work to the identities of the 85 % of women
who become mothers, and the structurallinkage of motherhood and economic
inequality, we need to accept as a given that empowering women requires
ending the economic marginalizationof mothers. She proposes a "listening
tour," informed by an epistemology that respects all truths as partial,flawed,
and situated-allforged in an arena of constraint. The law professor's role
is not to pronounce the "One True Way" but to seek points of respectful
coalition among people whose truths dffer.
INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time there was a world in which XXs were under intense social pressure to grow ponytails, and most of them did. But no one
with a ponytail could get a good job. The good jobs went to XYs.
Some XXs wanted nothing more than to resist the pressure to grow
ponytails. Their hearts' desire was for crewcuts.
A social movement arose to enable people with ponytails to get and
keep good jobs. But it soon deteriorated into infighting, as XXs who
wanted crewcuts protested that the movement to empower ponytails deflected attention from the real issue.
Every time the ponytails argued that they should have access to good
jobs, the XXs who wanted crewcuts argued that the ponytails' refusal to
cut their hair was hurting those who had the courage to spurn conven* Professor of Law and Director of the Program on Gender, Work & Family,
American University, Washington College of Law. My thanks to Kate Silbaugh for reading
drafts of this Essay, and to Jim Dempsey for his help and insight. Mistakes that remain are
mine alone. Many thanks for timely, precise, thorough, and insightful research assistance
from Abby Coleman and Rob Knight. This Essay was made possible by a research grant
from the Dean's Summer Research Fund at American University, Washington College of
Law.
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tion. "If you want a good job," they said, "you have to be ready, willing,
and able to do what XYs have always done to get them."
So the two groups fought. Meanwhile, XYs kept a low profile. They
continued to hold most of the good jobs, and the social and financial
power that accompanied them.

This Essay is a response to Vicki Schultz's Essay, "Life's Work," published last year in the Columbia Law Review.1 As the commentator whose
'joint property proposal" gives Schultz the name she uses for the group of
feminists she critiques, I will point out various ways in which she has mischaracterized this proposal. She conflates it with human capital theorists'
endorsement of traditional gender roles, and posits a Manichean struggle
between the forces of traditionalism and the forces of liberation. In fact,
something more subtle is at issue. The clash is not between women's liberation and traditionalism, but between two different models of what women's liberation might mean.
In this Essay, I argue that the most promising approach to work/
family issues is not a pronouncement of the importance of work roles by
work-identified women, no matter how sincerely felt. What we need instead is a listening tour, followed by rhetoric and proposals that resonate
with the lived experience both of women with work identities and of women whose identities stem solely from family roles. We also need a message that reflects the experience of men who feel pinched by a breadwinner role that places them under intense job pressure and attenuates their
participation in family life.
Framing such a message requires a familiarity with the literature on
workplaces, but it also requires drawing on recent work in pragmatism,
gender theory, work/family studies, family sociology, and social psychology. Only through a broad interdisciplinary approach can we avoid recycling the old fashioned and divisive sameness/difference debates of the
1980s.
I. FEMMES AND TOMBOYS:

RECYCLING THE SAMENESS/DIFFERENCE DEBATE

The first two rounds of the sameness/difference debate played out
in the 1980s. From the viewpoint of the new millenium, we can understand what was at issue better today than we could then.
Today it is commonplace to distinguish between women and gender
performances. This language can help defuse old battles about what women are "really like." For purposes of unpacking the old sameness/difference debate, the key point is that feminists differ in their relationship
to femininity. Some are femmes who embrace conventional gender per1. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881 (2000) [hereinafter Schultz,
Life's Work].
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formances. 2 For them, the key way to empower women is to end the devaluation of femininity. 3 Other feminists have a very different vision. 4 In
their view, the key to women's liberation is to empower women to disassociate themselves from disempowered feminine gender performances (including care work), and to replace those behaviors with socially valued
masculine gender performances (notably a close identification with paid
work and a strategy of off-loading family care work onto one's partner).5
6
Let us call this the strategy of the tomboys.
2. I am proposing to use the term "femme," traditionally used to describe a lesbian
committed to a feminine gender performance, to describe any woman committed to a
feminine gender performance. I use the term "tomboy" to describe any woman committed
to embracing a traditionally masculine gender performance. Joan Williams, Unbending
Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It 177-242 (2000)
[hereinafter Williams, Unbending Gender]. My use of these terms is meant to remind
women that all of us-gay, queer, and straight-embrace some parts of traditional
femininity and struggle with others. We should not let the fact that we embrace and
struggle with slightly (or very) different parts divide us against each other.
3. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, in Feminist Legal Theory:
Foundations 75, 78 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (associating women with the gender
performances enshrined in conventional femininity: "women value intimacy, develop a
capacity for nurturance, and an ethic of care"). West proposes to end the devaluation of
motherhood by framing a political theory around motherhood. See Robin West, Caring
for Justice 1-3 (1997) (using "parenting" as the central metaphor in her social theory).
4. For an example of how calling conventional femininity "the voice of women"
creates dissension between the femmes and tomboys, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism
Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence,
75 Iowa L. Rev. 1135, 1143 n.12 (1990). Schroeder has written:
West has stated that every woman she knows has recognized herself in In a
Different Voice. I literally recognized myself in the book and not in the way that
West suggests. When I was a college student I participated in one of the
psychological surveys discussed in the book.... I was one of the women who gave
the "archetypical" masculine response.... My "different voice" and the voices of
other women in the study who gave similar unladylike responses (and the male
subjects who gave "sissy" answers), even if we were in the minority, apparently
were not worthy of discussion ....
Id. Again, "women's voice" is not the voice of women; it is the voice of gender-typical
femininity. Calling it "women's voice" offends gender-atypical women, and makes it
difficult to create coalitions between femmes and tomboys.
5. See Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1,at 1883 (advocating an identity focused on
paid work); id. at 1906 (advocating the strategy of off-loading care work onto one's
partner). In fact, Schultz represents a very pure form of what I have called fullcommodification feminism. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 40-54. One
characteristic elision of this tradition that Schultz admits to inherit is the failure to grapple
with the widespread sense that some forms of family work are not commodifiable. Schultz,
Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1901 n.68. Schultz, however, shows no sign of reconciling this
insight with her well-worn advocacy of collectivizing housework. Id. at 1898. Nor does she
respond to the argument that full collectivization of care work is an undesirable strategy
because it perpetuates race and class hierarchies. See Williams, Unbending Gender, supra
note 2, at 145-76 (discussing in depth this argument); Dorothy Roberts, Spiritual and
Menial Housework, 9 Yale J.L. & Feminism 51, 55-56 (1997) (offering most
representations of this argument).
6. See Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 177-242.
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With this analysis in place, we can see that the 1980s "special versus
equal treatment" debate over the design of maternity policies pitted femmes (whose chief concern was to empower women in their traditional
caregiving roles) against tomboys (whose chief concern was to ensure
that those women who performed like men were not undermined by policies that treated women as different from men).7 The tomboys' focus was
on women committed to adopting traditionally masculine gender percommitted to givformances, whereas the femmes' focus was on women
8
ing traditionally feminine gender performances.
The "different voice" debate was another fight between the femmes
and the tomboys.9 Carol Gilligan, who gave this strain of feminism its
twentieth-century voice, wanted to ensure that the voice of conventionally
gendered women was not belittled in the name of norms framed around
the gender performances of conventional men.10 She and her followers
wanted not so much to change women as to make the world a more hospitable place for femmes. 1 ' Tomboys, myself included, bristled when
conventionally feminine gender performances were dubbed "the voice of
12
women."
The past year has shown that we have begun to recycle the sameness/difference debate. The new round, thus far, follows a familiar pattern. Feminists committed to making traditionally masculine gender performances available to women are pitted against feminists committed to
decreasing the costs of conventionally feminine gender performances.
This explains two recent exchanges in the Columbia Law Review. The first
is between Martha Fineman, whose analysis of gender focuses on motherhood, and Katherine Franke, who is committed to opening up space for
women to eschew motherhood in favor of the traditionally masculine
path of framing an identity primarily around sexuality.1 3 The second is
the current exchange, between Schultz, who is committed to opening up
space for women to adopt the traditionally masculine path of framing an
7. Id. at 217-32.
8. Id. at 226-31 (tomboys are "equal parenting advocates"; femmes are
maternalists").
9. Id. at 183-86.
10. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 17-23 (1982) (arguing that women's
"different voice" is not simply a less advanced form of morality). Williams, Unbending
Gender, supra note 2, at 178-83. My thanks to Kate Silbaugh for the insight that what
Gilligan did was to give this strain of feminism its twentieth-century voice.
11. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 178-83.
12. See generally Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797,
799-800 (1989) (critiquing Carol Gilligan's "different voice"). I have proposed to defuse
this conflict by having "different voice" feminists talk not about "the voice of women" but
rather "the voice of traditional femininity." As of yet, few have taken up the suggestion.
13. See generally, Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual
Family, and Other Twentieth-Century Tragedies (1995) [hereinafter Fineman, The
Neutered Mother]; See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law,
and Desire, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 205 (2001).
HeinOnline -- 102 Colum. L. Rev. 815 2002

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:812

identity primarily around paid work, 1 4 and the care work feminists she
15
critiqued in "Life's Work".
Which is the "True Feminist Way": to empower women in their feminine roles, or to enable women to invest their identities instead where
men traditionally have?
Shouldn't feminism do both?
Feminism is a loose coalition of many women who are dissatisfied
with traditional gender constraints for a variety of reasons. Some are
tomboys, dissatisfied that they are not allowed crewcuts. Some are femmes, dissatisfied that ponytails are costly.
Women are disadvantaged in both ways. 1 6 The agenda of empowering the ponytails is quite simply different-not better, not worse, just dif14. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1900-15.
15. See, e.g., Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of
Care 157 (1994) ("Because our society does not notice the importance of care and the
moral quality of its practice, we devalue the work and contributions of women .... only if
we understand care as a political idea will we be able to change its status and the status of
those who do caring work in our culture."); Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at
55 ("We need to... chang[e] the definition of the ideal worker so that it reflects the norm
of parental care. Instead of simply allowing women to work on the same terms traditionally
available to men, we need to change the conditions under which both men and women
work."); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's
Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 17, 29 (1998) ("The twin
problems of displaced homemaker indigency and devaluation of female labor are largely
gender-related. While a single legal innovation cannot disrupt entrenched gender
inequality, measures directed toward commodifying homemaking have the potential to
contribute significantly to the alleviation of inequities."); Martha Albertson Fineman,
Contract and Care, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1403, 1411-12 (2001) ("[Elven though there may
be some recognition that caretaking is of public benefit, no compensation and scant
accommodation have been given to caretakers by societal institutions other than the
family. . . . This injustice can only be addressed by policies that both subsidize and
accommodate caretakers."); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths:
Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 13,
18-19 (2000) ("[C]aretaking work creates a collective or societal debt.... The mandate
that the state.., respond to dependency.., is not a matter of altruism or empathy. . ., but
one that is primary and essential because such a response is fundamentally societypreserving."); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1996) ("[D]enying housework its status as work is costly to those who
perform it. A consistent account within the law of housework's economic value would
benefit those who perform the work-predominantly women."). See generally Symposium
on the Structures of Care Work, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1389 (2001) (arguing for the
recognition of a new field of inquiry in feminist jurisprudence). Schultz says that "[n]o
self-respecting feminist could be against 'valuing housework,"' Schultz, Life's Work, supra
note 1, at 1990, but her article ducks some hard questions on how to do so. While she
acknowledges in a single sentence that the full-commodification strategy may have some
limitations, id. at 1902 ("There may, of course, be some forms of household labor that
cannot or should not be commodified."), she never explores the subject further.
Exploring these limits is a crucial issue that cannot be dismissed.
16. Compare sources cited in supra note 15, with Mary Anne Case, How High the
Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care
for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1753, 1757-59 (2001) (detailing how
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ferent-from the agenda of allowing women crewcuts. If we insist on
sanctifying the "One True Way," we will only deflect our energy away
from achieving gender change into the sameness/difference debate and
other fights among feminists.
Importing these gender wars into feminist jurisprudence will help
none of us. Nor will they be easy to avoid. The first step is for care work
theorists to remember that women without children suffer daily affronts
because of the societal expectation and celebration of motherhood. As
Mary Anne Case has shown so eloquently, it is a bit much for a woman
without children to be both maligned and belittled for being "childless"
and also expected to sacrifice for OPC ("other people's children").17
This situation is particularly galling when the woman in question has
heavy care work responsibilities that are ignored by proposals to value
care work that focus on child care to the exclusion of other forms of
family work (for example, caring for parents or seriously ill partners).18
Care work advocates not only need to respect the daily affronts faced
by nonmothers. They also need to formulate policy proposals that are
not limited to mothers or even to women. Human resource professionals
point out that the most effective way to implement a work/life program is
to ask not why a given worker wants flexibility, but whether the specific
19
proposal will meet the employer's legitimate business needs. If an employee can make a valid business case for flexibility, why should the employee's motivation matter?20 The key is to replace the marginalized
mommy tracks available today with a variety of possibilities that offer flexibility without marginalization.2 1 Only when flexibility is no longer associwomen without children are disadvantaged by measures designed to help primary
caregivers).
17. Id. at 1754 n.5, 1755 n.7, 1757 ("'[T]he existing employees' on whom the 'excess
work' resulting from schedules favoring mothers on the job is 'dumped' are other women,
most likely women without children"). Katherine Franke used the phrase "OPC" at the
"Hegemonic and Resistant Genderings: Changing the Relationship of Market Work to
Family Work," Gender, Work & Family Project, American Univ.-Washington College of
Law, Washington, D.C., June 4-6, 1999.
18. Case, supra note 16, at 1754 n.5.
19. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 98.
20. The backlash against family friendly policies stems from situations where
employers allow a mother to go part-time, pocket the part of her salary she is no longer
paid, and then overwork the remaining employees without additional compensation. This
is not a way to implement a family-responsive policy; it is a way to sabotage one. See Elinor
Burkett, The Baby Boon 38-44 (2000) (attacking family friendly workplaces on the
grounds they "cheat the childless").
21. Most "family friendly" programs today suffer from very low usage rates because
they marginalize those who use them. For an analysis of how family friendly programs
offered by law firms marginalize those who use them, see Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas
Calvert, Balanced Hours: Usable Part-Time Policies for Washington Law Firms, Final
Report of the Project on Attorney Retention 14, 16-19, 20-41 (2001), available at http://
www.pardc.org/final-report.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing how
part-time policies at law firms marginalize the attorneys who use them, introducing the
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ated with career suicide will men begin to feel free to break out of the
22
ideal worker role so many find constraining and oppressive.
Just as it is important for care work advocates to respect the daily
affronts faced by nonmothers, women without children need to remember that the gender system that leads them to be treated as if they are
somehow defective because they are not mothers simultaneously leads
2
women who are mothers into marginalization and relative poverty. 3
24
Both groups have a stake in the deconstruction of domesticity.
II.

WHAT

Do JOINT

PROPERTY ADVOCATES ADVOCATE?

Schultz describes a group she calls joint property advocates, who
tend "to reify traditional male-breadwinner, female-homemaker patterns
in a way that closes down, rather that opens up, strategies for change," so
that:
the only viable approach becomes the separate-but-equal one of
paying women to do housework, while leaving unexamined the
broader economic and political forces which deprive women of
the bargaining power necessary to obtain a more egalitarian
sharing of labor in their households, and which prevent us from
building a political system that provides the public support
nec25
essary for women and men to lead more balanced lives.
Joint property theorists make "traditional gender-based arrangements for household labor appear inevitable, [thereby making] .. .it
seem impossible to reshape social life to structure family life in more egalitarian ways."' 26 Schultz protests against this "attempt to revive the familywage system" and to "provide even more encouragement for women to
invest in patriarchal relationships." 27 She links joint property advocates
with the work of conservative human capital theorists, noting their "failure to take women seriously as workers,"28 with policies that "reproduce
the very gender-based patterns of labor that create women's disadvan"PAR usability test" to enable employers to assess whether their policy marginalizes those
who use it, and articulating a model policy that avoids marginalization).
22. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that the idealized worker
is someone who works full-time and overtime and takes little or no time off for
childbearing or childrearing); see also id. at 25-30 (documenting the oppressive elements
of the ideal worker role); id. at 59 (showing that a high percentage of men would prefer to
cut back on work hours in favor of more family or personal time).
23. See discussion infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
24. In drafting this Essay, I consciously avoided focusing on issues relating to poor
women and women of color because a recognized expert had agreed to write on these
subjects in this volume. Unfortunately, due to circumstances surrounding September 11,
that essay was never submitted. This unfortunate circumstance in no way is meant to imply
that the important issues surrounding care work-both the problems and the solutionscan be adequately discussed without considering race and class dimensions.
25. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1905-06.
26. Id. at 1905.
27. Id. at 1908.
28. Id. at 1899.
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the assumption "that housework is, and will continue to be,

'women's work'[;]"30 the view that "women care more about children[;]J 31 and with a dismissal of the goal of involving men in household
32
work as unrealistic.
Schultz sees little difference between joint property advocates and
difference feminists such as Christine Littleton,3 3 who in 1987 proposed
an "equality as acceptance" model designed to end the penalties associated with women's caregiving roles. 3 4 Joint property advocates, like accommodationists, "appear to be relatively untroubled by the segregationist implications" of their proposals, according to Schultz.3 5 Not only does
she see little difference between joint property advocates and difference
feminists, she also notes few differences between either group and neotraditionalist human capital theorists who embrace traditional gender
roles as normatively desirable ("efficient").36
Schultz's survey is curious from my perspective because 1) it misdescribes the joint property proposal as an embrace of traditional gender
roles; 37 2) it glosses over the shared ideal of an egalitarian thirty hour
workweek; 38 3) it makes assertions about family dynamics that do not cite
or respond to the relevant scholarly literatures; 39 and 4) it ignores recent
work documenting that a significant proportion of women's economic
40
disadvantage is attributable to their family roles.
A. Does the Joint Property Proposal Embrace Traditional Gender Roles?
Originally published in the Georgetown Law Review in 1994, the joint
property proposal is a regime for income-sharing after divorce. 4 1 The
analysis begins by noting that husbands in what I call the "dominant family ecology" could not perform as ideal workers without a flow of family
work from their wives. 42 Thus the ideal-worker wage (typically nearly seventy percent of the family income) 43 embeds the woman's labor as well as
29. Id. at 1900.
30. Id. at 1905.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1955.
34. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279, 1301
(1987).
35. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1955.
36. Id. at 1903.
37. Id. at 1954.
38. Id. at 1957.
39. Id. at 1905.
40. Id. at 1902-03.
41. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Legal Theory of Alimony, 82
Geo. L.J. 2227, 2253-66 (1994) [hereinafter Williams, Is Coverture Dead?].
42. Id. at 2236-37.
43. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 60. More recent calculations fix
fathers' share of family income at sixty-eight percent. I would like to thank Steve Hipple,
who calculated the current figures using the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of the
HeinOnline -- 102 Colum. L. Rev. 819 2002
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the man's. For this reason, the wage should be treated as a family wage,
replacing the current "he who earns it, owns it" rule that now treats it as
the sole personal property of the husband, 44 thereby impoverishing di45
vorced women and their children.
The joint property proposal is carefully designed to give not only the
divorcing woman, but also her husband or ex-husband, the motivation to
assure that she develops and sustains a serious job involvement. 46 The
proposed entitlement is designed so that the more marginalized a divorced man's ex-wife remains, the more of "his" income will be owned by
her in the event of divorce. Thejoint property proposal therefore creates
a significant incentive for the man to support the employment efforts of
his wife or ex-wife.
This is clearly not a regime designed to perpetuate traditional gender roles, as I noted in the initial proposal itself.4 7 The former wife's
incentive is that, in the case of the prototypical divorce (after four years
and two children), 48 income sharing will end a short time after the children cease to be dependent, leaving the woman to support herself on her
own. 49 Husbands also have an incentive to ensure that both parents do
market work, because the more an ex-wife earns, the less the ex-husband
will have to pay to achieve income equalization. 5 0 Schultz makes no mention of any of this.

Census' Current Population Survey (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.bls.census.gov/
cps/cpsmain.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Current Population
Survey].
44. Williams, Is Coverture Dead?, supra note 41, at 2250-52.
45. Nearly forty percent of divorced women end up in poverty, more than twice the
national poverty rate. Demie Kurz, For Richer for Poorer: Mothers Confront Divorce 3
(1995). Schultz worries that giving women joint ownership of the ideal-worker wage will
exacerbate economic disparities among women. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at
1912 ("U]oint property feminists tie homemakers' pay to their spouses' income-a
methodology that introduces severe class bias."). She does not note, however, that the only
alternative is leaving family wealth disproportionately in the hands of men. While social
redistribution may well be a desirable goal, leaving women poor while men remain rich
hardly seems a desirable strategy for achieving it.
46. If Schultz is advocating eliminating post-divorce entitlements, her proposal
recycles an earlier round of the sameness/difference debate: Herma Hill Kay's 1987
proposal to eliminate alimony for younger women on the grounds that preserving alimony
only encourages dependence. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on
No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 80 (1987). Kay quickly backed off
her proposal after a firestorm of opposition. Herma Hill Kay, Commentary: Toward a
Theory of Fair Distribution, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 775, 763 (1991). See Williams, Unbending
Gender, supra note 2, at 222.
47. Williams, Is Coverture Dead?, supra note 41, at 2261-62.
48. Id. at 2261.
49. Id. at 2262.
50. Id.
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B. The Egalitarian Thirty Hour Workweek
Schultz distinguishes herself from those who embrace traditional
gender roles by holding up an egalitarian thirty hour workweek as her
ideal. 51 The irony is that, unnoted by her, I do too. My joint property
proposal is linked with a proposal to restructure market work that posits a
52
rosy vision of two parents each working a thirty hour week.
Schultz's amputation of the joint property proposal from the proposal to restructure market work is particularly troubling because the two
proposals (published in successive chapters of the same book) are designed to work together, based on my analysis of gender wars among wo53
men and gender pressures on men.
Central to my analysis of domesticity (my term for what Schultz calls
the "family-wage system") 5 4 is the contention that, as a gender system, it
creates fights among women that have hobbled feminists' political effectiveness.5 5 It is to avoid "gender wars" that I link a proposal designed to
appeal to women whose identities are framed solely around family roles
(the joint property proposal) with a proposal designed to appeal to women who also identify with paid work (the proposal to restructure market
work).56 The goal is to send the message that all women, employed or
not, are disadvantaged by the erasure of care work. Both mothers at
home full time and employed women have responded positively to my
book, Unbending Gender, suggesting that my approach does have potential
57
to defuse the bitter "mommy wars" and build a coalition among women.
Linking the two proposals is designed not only to unite women, but
to change gender pressures on men. The joint property proposal is designed to eliminate the carrot that keeps men in traditional roles, while
the proposal to restructure market work is designed to eliminate the
5 81
stick.
51. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1957 n.305.
52. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 100.
53. Intriguingly, Schultz fails to cite chapter three of Unbending Gender, where I
discuss my proposal to restructure market work. She also cites to a law review article
published in Harvard Blackletter without giving any indication she knows that the same
material appeared as my chapter five. See Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1910
n. 105.
54. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1913.
55. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 145-76.
56. Id. at 174.
57. For example, I have been invited to make keynote speeches at conferences of
"sequencing" mothers and of female lawyers. Joan Williams, Celebrating Mothers'
Choices: Making New Ones, Keynote Speech at the Conference of Mothers & More (Oct.
19, 2001) (Mothers & More is a grassroots organization of mothers at home full time);
Joan Williams, Do you have a Usable and Effective Balanced Hours Policy?, Keynote
Speech at Colorado Women's Bar Association Annual Conference (May 19, 2001).
58. One does not have to delve deeply into Unbending Gender to worry about the
accuracy of Schultz's claim that joint property theorists "rarely ... attempt to question
whether overwork is harmful to men too." Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1955. I
discuss the toll on men not only on the cover, where I say that our current system is "bad
HeinOnline -- 102 Colum. L. Rev. 821 2002

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:812

The carrots that keep men in the ideal-worker role are the current
incentives that make it relatively riskless for men to overinvest in market
work and underinvest in family relationships. This skewed investment
strategy today is artificially costless for men, who can insist (explicitly or
implicitly) that their wives or girlfriends marginalize themselves, secure in
the knowledge that they will never have to share the financial penalty
associated with that marginalization. The joint property proposal
changes this by eliminating a father's right to "walk with his wallet" and
offer a new (and typically younger) wife the chief family asset produced
by the dominant family ecology in his first marriage: the ideal-worker
59
wage.
Linked with the proposal to eliminate the carrot is a proposal to
eliminate the stick that keeps men in ideal-worker roles: employers' ability to punish anyone who does not perform as an ideal worker, putting
work before family full-time, full-force for forty years. 6" Schultz herself
acknowledges this stick when she notes that men who do fifty percent or
more of the household work suffer a "substantial earnings penalty." 61
Given gender pressures on men, notably the regrettable extent to
which "[m] asculinity is measured by the size of a paycheck," 62 most men
will not feel able to cut back on job commitments in order to share
equally at home so long as workers are offered only two alternatives:
ideal worker or wipe-out. What we need is a "Third Path" that offers proportional pay, benefits, training, and advancement for proportional work
("part-time parity") instead of a wipe-out.63 These are the requirements
for bringing to life the ideal of a shared thirty hour workweek. Few men
will work a thirty hour week so long as that schedule is considered a
marginalized mommy track that carries steep compensation penalties
(often including the elimination of benefits) and an end to career
progress.
If Schultz is arguing, as she sometimes seems to be, that everyone
should be required to work no more than thirty hours per week, 64 it would
be informative to know how she intends to forbid those who want to work
for men, worse for women, and worst of all for children," but also in chapters one and two.
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of Unbending Gender is its argument that feminists need to
also focus their attention on gender pressures on men.
59. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 124-31.
60. See id. at 66-81 (detailing masculine norms in market work).
61. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1907.
62. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 25 (quoting Robert E. Gould,
Measuring Masculinity by the Size of a Paycheck, in Men and Masculinity 96, 96 (Joseph
Pleck &Jack Sawyer eds., 1974)).
63. See generally ThirdPath Institute, Redesigning Work, at http://www.thirdpath.
org/redesignsing-work.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (assisting with redefining job options and flexibility). Schultz also appears to
embrace the goal of proportional benefits for part-time work without noting that some
'joint property feminists" do so, too. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1,at 1956.
64. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1956-57.
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more from doing so. Even in European countries that have adopted a
thirty-two or thirty-five hour week, high-level managers and profession65
als-disproportionately male-typically work longer hours.
Assuming that Schultz's proposal is not a prohibition but an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act 66 that would require employers to
pay double time after thirty or thirty-five hours and would apply to managerial as well as nonexempt employees, the proposal sounds more different from my approach than it is in practice. Because no significant constituency now exists for Schultz's proposal, she is left where I am, trying to
build a coalition in support of "a new cultural ideal that would allow both
67
women and men more time for home, community, and nation."
Introducing a bill that requires a thirty hour workweek may not be
the most effective approach for cultural reasons: In our immigrant culture, virtue has long been linked with "hard work." 68 Moreover, a new
law requiring the most powerful men in the country to pay overtime for
any hours worked in excess of a forty hour week whenever their staffs
leave Capitol Hill, Wall Street, or Silicon Valley at midnight hardly seems
a slam dunk.
An alternative is to create nonmarginalized alternative work schedules (some of which will be "part-time" schedules of forty hours per
week). These alternative work schedules could be expected to attract significant numbers of men, based on polls that report that many men (par69
ticularly those who work long hours) would prefer to work fewer hours.
Narrative sociology also reports that many men are under new and hydraulic pressure to increase their contributions to family work, 70 which
recent demographic research 7' suggests will often require cutting back
65. Juliet Webster, Reconciling Adaptability and Equal Opportunities in European
Workplaces: Report for DG-Employment of the European Commission 26 (April 2001),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employmentsocial/equopp/documents/
reconcilwebster.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
66. The Fair Labor Standards Act currently requires employers, unless specifically
exempted, to pay covered employees overtime for time worked beyond forty hours in a
workweek at a rate of at least one and one-half times the regular rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207
(1994).
67. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1957.
68. Long work hours are linked not only with the diligence of immigrants who came
to America to "get ahead," but also with the dignity of professional status. See, e.g., Sara
Rimer, Raid and Investigation Unite City for Immigrant, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2001, at A9
(detailing story of hardworking immigrant, who is quoted as saying, "We're
management... We work 24/7").
69. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 59.
70. Lillian B. Rubin, Families on the Fault Line 77, 83-84 (1994) (noting that one of
the key differences between her 1976 and 1994 studies of working-class families is the
increased pressure on men to contribute equally to household work).
71. See, e.g., Liana Claire Sayer, Time Use, Gender and Inequality: Differences in
Men's and Women's Market, Nonmarket, and Leisure Time 183 (2001) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (arguing
that "mothers' time in housework and child care is less responsive to time pulls from
market work" than fathers'); see also Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Is Anyone Doing the
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on the long hours of overtime that nearly one-fourth of fathers work. 72
Creating a Third Path that provides an alternative to the "ideal worker or
wipe-out" syndrome could help achieve the "new cultural ideal" proposed
by Schultz.
C. Family Dynamics and Sex Discrimination
In "Life's Work" and in earlier law review articles, Schultz demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of the workplace dynamics that
have kept women out of traditionally masculine jobs, and an impressive
73
command of the relevant legal and sociological labor literature.
"[E]arly socialization is a necessary but insufficient condition to account
for sex segregation at work," concluded Schultz in 1990, summarizing the
work of one researcher.7 4 "Keeping women in their place economically
requires a lifelong system of social control that must be exercised
75
powerfully within the workplace itself."
Note how Schultz's source posits a multicausal analysis: workplace
dynamics plus socialization. Yet in the conclusion to her 1990 article, Schultz appears to conclude that women's employment patterns reflect workplace dynamics alone: "In a very real sense, employers create women's
76
job preferences.
The important insight that workplace dynamics play a role in creating women's employment preferences does not prove that workplace dynamics alone account for women's economic position. Yet in "Life's
Work," Schultz posits an either/or dichotomy between "scholars [who]
argue that women's economic disadvantage arises from their primary
commitment to their families" and scholars (like Schultz herself) who argue that women's economic disadvantage arises "from sexist dynamics in
77
labor markets and firms."
This is a false dichotomy. One can argue that women's economic
disadvantage stems both from sexist dynamics in labor markets and firms
and from other dynamics as well (including, but not limited to, family
Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor, 79 Soc. Forces 191, 216
tbl.5 (2000) (demonstrating that as husbands' hours of market work rise, their household
contributions diminish).
72. 1 would like to thank Steve Hipple for also calculating these figures regarding
fathers' work hours from the Current Population Survey, supra note 43.
73. See Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1903; Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683, 1748-55 (1998) [hereinafter Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment]; Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and
Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749, 1815-40 (1990)
[hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories].
74. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 73, at 1824 (citing Jerry A. Jacobs, Revolving
Doors: Sex Segregation and Women's Careers 48 (1989)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1841.
77. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1900.
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dynamics). This is what I have attempted to do in Unbending Gender. I
posit a multicausal model, in which I explore not only sexist workplace
dynamics-which include labor markets and firms that define the ideal
worker as someone without responsibilities for family work 78 -but also
other causes of women's disadvantaged economic position, including
gender pressures on men, gender pressures on women, and the lack of
79
suitable public supports for childrearing and other care work.
In Schultz's prior studies, which focused on women's absence from
traditionally masculine jobs, her monocausal model had few ill effects. In
"Life's Work," however, Schultz has expanded her focus from women in
traditionally masculine jobs to women in general. This shift of topic requires a more complex model and an examination of literatures other
than those Schultz has relied on in the past.
It is hard, first, to see how one can speak with such authority on the
interaction of work and family roles without engaging with the extensive
work/family literature. 8° Nor does she engage the extensive family law
literature on the persistence of traditionalist family roles and the consequent need for post-divorce entitlements. 81 Gender theory offers additional relevant literatures. The best known is Judith Butler's metaphor of
gender as performative, which has been cited in law review articles to
help explain family dynamics that affect women's relationship to employment. 82 Sociologists have developed the closely related metaphor of "doing gender."83 Less well known, but perhaps most useful, is Kay Deaux's
78. Note that one need only deny the role of women's family roles if one leaves
unchallenged employers' right to define the ideal worker as someone without family
responsibilities. My argument is that this definition is an integral part of sexist workplace
dynamics.
79. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 25-37, 235-39.
80. Due to space constraints, I will refer the reader to my review of the work/family
literature in chapters one through three of Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 276-303
(citing more than fifty work/family studies). Schultz cites very little of the massive
academic literature. Instead, she relies largely on a single book, Rosalind C. Barnett &
Caryl Rivers, She Works/He Works (1996).
81. For a review of the relevant family law literature as of 1994, see Williams, Is
Coverture Dead?, supra note 41, at 2227 n.1 (citing more than twenty books and articles
discussing post-divorce impoverishment of women due to the persistence of traditional
gender roles). It should be noted that much more family law literature has been published
since.
82. The germinal work is Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (1990). For an example of
the use of Butler's work in a law review article relating to caretaking, see Naomi R. Cahn,
Gendered Identities: Women and Household Work, 44 Vill. L. Rev. 525, 532 (1999) ("The
concept of gender performance has various meanings, depending on the context. Within
feminist critical theory, it generally refers to the practice of constructing gender through
conduct associated with that gender."); Naomi R. Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 Yale
J.L. & Feminism 177, 184 nn.30-31 (2000) [hereinafter Cahn, Power of Caretaking].
83. See, e.g., Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, in The Social
Construction of Gender 13, 13-15 (Judith Lorber & Susan A. Farrell eds., 1991)
(proposing a model of gender as produced in the course of social interactions rather than
as a stable identity).
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work in social psychology theorizing gender as social interaction.
Deaux's model, which highlights the complex interactions between internal states, social roles, status, power, and outside institutional forces, eschews monocausal explanations. It could be very helpful in pinpointing
the complex interactions between power and status allocations of men
and of women, institutional forces such as sexist labor market dynamics
and the lack of social supports for childrearing, and internal states and
social roles that create sustained gender pressures on men as well as
84
women.
Schultz's failure to grapple with the work/family literature, the family law literature, and gender theory impedes her analysis in several ways.
First, her confidence that "women cannot afford to specialize in homemaking at the expense of paid employment '8 5 overlooks the persistence
of traditional gender roles: One out of four mothers aged twenty-five to
forty-four is still a homemaker, 8 6 and the less affluent the mother the
more likely she is to be out of the labor force. 8 7 Second, Schultz's confidence that "women are . . . satisfied with their diverse roles," 88 glosses

over the extensive literature documenting that many women experience
acute and painful work/family conflict, as is evidenced by the way my
book, Unbending Gender, has been cited by family therapists. 89 Third, Schultz fails to grapple with evidence that many women may well find an allencompassing identification with market work alienating because they retain commitments to caregiving and other traditionally feminine gender
performances.1 ° Finally, Schultz's opposition to post-divorce entitlements for women on the grounds that they "provide even more encouragement for women to invest in patriarchal relationships" 9 1 glosses over
84. See, e.g., Kay Deaux & Marianne Lafrance, Gender, in I The Handbook of Social
Psychology 788, 790 (T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998) (articulating a complex model of
gender).
85. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1908.
86. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 2.
87. Joan Williams, Afterword: Exploring the Economic Meanings of Gender, 49 Am.
U. L. Rev. 987, 1019-20 tbls.1 & 2 (1999).
88. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1907 (quoting Barnett & Rivers, supra note
80, at 29).
89. For evidence that many women experience acute and painful work/family
conflict, see Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 16-19, 48-49, 146-47, 153-57.
For evidence of how Unbending Gender has been taken up by family therapists, see, e.g.,
Ashley Harvey, An Interview withJoan Williams, 13J. Feminist Fam. Therapy (forthcoming
Spring 2002); Ashley Harvey, Book Review of Unbending Gender, Amazon.com, at http://
www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195147146/qid=1014081822/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_3_
1/002-8152448-6461626 (last visited Mar. 10, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("Critical information for family therapists .... Williams' book has important implications
for family therapy, as many male and female clients struggle with how to combine market
work and family work. It will change the way you educate, normalize, and approach this
issue with clients.").
90. See Cahn, Power of Caretaking, supra note 82, at 182-83, 192-98 (arguing that
women retain commitments to caretaking).
91. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1908.
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an important bit of legal history: When post-divorce entitlements were
cut back after the "divorce revolution" of the 1970s, 92 this did not prevent
women from staying home. Rather, it simply impoverished those who
did, leaving nearly forty percent of today's divorced mothers in poverty. 93
D. The Family Wage Gap Between Mothers and Other Adults
Schultz associates the claim that motherhood creates economic penalties solely with conservative human capital theorists who defend traditional gender roles as efficient, and argues that these are the authors
whom joint property theorists "tend to" reference. 94 In fact, my analysis
relies on recent work by economist Jane Waldfogel. 95 In a series of articles, Waldfogel documented that while "the gap in pay between women
and men has been narrowing, the gap between women with children and
96
those without children has been widening" in the past few decades.
"Having children had positive or no effects for men, but very strongly
negative effects for women, and these effects increased from 1980 to
1991." 9 7 By 1991, the pay gap between mothers and others was larger
than the pay gap between men and women. 98 Single mothers (whether
never married or divorced) fare worse than married mothers. 99
If Schultz disputes Waldfogel's findings, it may be more useful to
articulate her reasons for challenging these findings than to charge that
fellow feminists who rely on them are blindly following human capital
theory. Feminists need only deny that family roles account for part of
women's economic disadvantage if they adhere to the traditional view
that women's "choice" disproves the existence of gender discrimination.1 00 But it does not.
Say, in a segregated country, there are two drinking fountains, one
for whites only. If a person of color walks up to the other, that is a
92. The divorce revolution both cut back on alimony and changed the practice of
awarding the family house to custodial wives. See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce
Revolution 73, 143-44 (1985).
93. Kurz, supra note 45, at 3.
94. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1903.
95. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 2.
96. Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with
Children, 12J. Econ. Persp. 137, 137 (1998) [hereinafter Waldfogel, Family Gap]; see also
Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women's Wages, 62 Am. Soc. Rev. 209, 209
(1997) ("There is also a persistent 'family gap'; that is, mothers earn lower hourly wages
than do women without children.").
97. Waldfogel, Family Gap, supra note 96, at 147.
98. Id. at 148.
99. Id. at 144. This is not surprising. The ideal-worker norm is hard on married
mothers, but single mothers are the most disadvantaged by a system that defines its
workplace ideals in terms of a worker who is supported by a flow of family work from a
nonemployed or marginally employed wife.
100. The best known theorists of the popular notion that women's "choice" disproves
the existence of gender discrimination are the human capital theorists. For Schultz's
discussion, see Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1893-98.
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choice. But that choice does not negate the existence of discrimination.' 0 1 Similarly, if employers define the ideal worker as someone who
takes no time off for childbearing or childrearing, they are framing their
ideal worker as someone with the body and traditional life patterns of a
man. Regardless of mothers' choices, that is sex discrimination. 112
E. What's the Fight About?
What Schultz depicts as an epic struggle between the forces of traditionalism and the forces of liberation is, in fact, something more subtle.
As I have noted above, what's involved is a fight between the femmes and
the tomboys.
The group Schultz calls joint property feminists' 0 -more accurately
called care work advocates-rejects the strategy of empowering women by
requiring them to abandon traditionally feminine gender performances.
Some care work advocates are femmes who embrace the traditional allocation of caregiving to women.' 0 4 Others are tomboys who feel solidarity
with femmes, either because they see the devaluation of femininity as very
close to the devaluation of women or because they feel that, to be effective or to be respectful, they need to meet feminine women on their own
ground rather than insisting that women embrace the traditions of
5
masculinity. 10
In my view, American feminists have little choice but to take traditionally feminine gender performances as a given, for a simple reason:
The traditions of femininity have proven remarkably persistent. Today,
two out of three mothers are employed less than forty hours a week during the key years of career advancement-and eighty-five percent of women become mothers. 11 6 In an economy where many of the best jobs
101. Critical race scholars have often pointed out that analogies between race and sex
need to be used with caution. See Devon Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights,
47 UCLA L. Rev. 1467, 1489 n.79. My use of the drinking fountain analogy is not meant to
imply that the disadvantages associated with motherhood are identical to those associated
with the American apartheid. I use the analogy for a limited purpose: to deconstruct the
choice argument that is so powerful in the gender context-but transparently ludicrous in
the context of race.
102. Actually, it is gender discrimination: defining the ideal worker in that way
polices men back into breadwinner roles as it polices women out of them.
103. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1907-08.
104. See, e.g., Fineman, The Neutered Mother, supra note 13, at 87-89, 230-33
(opposing the "neutering" of "Mother," and making it clear that her goal is to empower
women in their traditional mothering role); Mary Becker, Caring for Children and
Caretakers, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1495, 1512 (2001) (self-identifying as a theorist who
advocates empowering mothers in their traditional role because she is "skeptical of the
likelihood of men actually engaging in equal parenting").
105. See, e.g., Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 146-50 (arguing for the
importance of creating coalitions among women who live according to the traditions of
femininity, and those who challenge those traditions).
106. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the figure is nearly
ninety percent). I used the eighty-five percent figure on the advice of demographer
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(blue as well as white collar) require overtime, overtime work among
10 7
mothers is rare: ninety-two percent work less than fifty hours a week.
We law professors may be tomboys, but the femmes are going strong. 10 8
III. CHANGING THE ROLE Or PERSONAL NARRATrvE IN FEMINISM: WHY
THEORY MATTERS

How can we avoid a new round of sameness/difference debates between femmes and tomboys? One way is to pay closer attention to theory.
Richard Rorty often says that theory does not matter. 10 9 He is wrong.
Theory matters a lot.
The viewpoint I have been articulating stems from pragmatist theory,
which is premised on the notion that every viewpoint is situated and
therefore partial. 10 Every truth reflects a specific subject position; most
theorists start from their own (although some do not: Lucie White is a
good example)." 1 '
While theorists typically start from their own subject position, they
should not end there. For example, women law professors in traditionally masculine white-collar jobs, citing studies of women in traditionally
masculine blue-collarjobs, should not assume that all women are, or want
to be, as work-identified as they are.
Not only are other people's truths partial. Mine are too. How can
we build a feminist theory that reflects the situated nature of truth in a
world where women are in very different subject positions?
Suzanne Bianchi. For more recent statistics, see Lynne M. Caspar & Suzanne M. Bianchi,
Continuity & Change in the American Family 72 tbl.3.1 (tabulating cumulative fertility
patterns) (forthcoming 2002); id. at 75 tbl.3.3 (tabulating first-birth probabilities for
childless women).
107. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 2.
108. Schultz relies on traditional statistics of full-commodification feminism, which
veil the extent of women's continuing marginalization by treating the crucial divide as one
between women who are in the workforce and those who are not. Schultz, Life's Work,
supra note 1, at 1906 nn.82 & 86-87, 1908 nn.92-96. Two key points: First, many women
in the workforce are in marginalized part-time or mommy track jobs; second, workforce
participation figures gloss over the very high proportions of mothers who are marginalized
during the key job-building years. This is why, with the kind assistance of economist
Manuelita Ureta and demographer Suzanne Bianchi, I have generated a new data series
documenting the high level of economic marginalization among mothers by asking not
how many women are employed (i.e., putting part-time workers in the same category as
full-time workers) but by asking instead how many women are marginalized (lumping parttimers with mothers at home, based on the punitive conditions that currently exist in parttime work). Space constraints prohibit me from developing this point further here, and
from even mentioning it in the text.
109. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity xiv-xvi (1989).
110. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 260-70.
111. See generally Lucie White, Quality Child Care for Low-Income Families:
Despair, Impasse, Improvisation, in Hard Labor: Women and Work in the Post-Welfare
Era 116 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999) (analyzing the experience of lowincome women, based on interviews).
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Just because a given viewpoint seems indubitably true based on our
own lives or the lives of our mothers, we cannot generalize that viewpoint
into a prescription for all women.
If the goal is to create an effective coalition to improve the economic
position of women, one key is to bridge the divide between women with a
workplace identity and women without one. This requires an empathetic
stance in which women identified with a job are open to the truths of
women without jobs, and family-identified women are open to the truths
of women who retain commitments both to family work and market work.
Bridging this divide is a crucial first step if the goal is to forge an effective
coalition.
Schultz writes from an older, transcendentalist tradition in which
nineteenth-century treatise writers and twentieth-century law professors
tell people what to do. This role works well when what is at issue is the
"mailbox rule." That is to say, people are willing to let treatise writers and
law professors tell them whether an offer should be valid on dispatch or
upon receipt, fundamentally because it does not matter what the rule is
so long as everyone agrees on A or B.
But the issues Schultz discusses in "Life's Work" do not involve an
arbitrary commercial rule. Her topic is how people should live their lives.
On issues as intimate as those involving work and family, the question is
how to persuade people to rethink the warp and woof of their daily lives.
We are lawyers; it should not be big news that the way to reach an
audience is to send a message that you understand their concerns and
respect their divergent truths. What we need is not a pronouncement, no
matter how sincerely felt. We need a listening tour. As I have written
elsewhere:
For me, the key insight is that I do not know everything about
what is best for women. I have a few basic commitments-to
equal opportunities for meaningful (market and family) work,
to equal entitlements to bodily integrity, to ending the eroticizing of dominance. Beyond that, I tack back and forth, bargaining with my traditions, much as other women do. Like them, I
112
try to do the best I can.
All women are the products of our gender traditions. We are simultaneously liberated by them, oppressed by them, and constructed by
them. To use an image common among philosophers: Even if we need
to rebuild the boat, we must remember we are in the middle of the sea.
The very natural fear is that, if we tear down too much, we will sink like a
stone.
We need to respect divergent deals women strike with their gender
traditions, and recognize that each of us has made trade-offs she would
prefer not to have had to make. This philosophy creates a very different
112. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 276.
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tone, and a different set of policy mandates, than one that assumes that
the theorist can deduce and deliver the "Truth About Gender."
The only alternative to respectful listening is a series of gender wars
in which each woman will criticize those a bit more work-identified than
she for callously disregarding her family's needs, and each woman will
criticize those a bit more family-identified than she for reinforcing stereotypes. With a thousand different points on the work/family continuum,
the resulting gender wars will preclude social change. To build a coalition capable of improving the economic position of all women, we need
to meet women where they are and respect their divergent truths-which
are as flawed and situated as our own.
In particular, women as work-identified as the typical law professor
need to remember that we have it easy: We have had access to jobs that
are highly-paid, high-status, and extraordinarily flexible (at least after tenure). We do not have jobs where, once we are at work, we cannot even
make a phone call to check whether our kids, at home alone, are okayas is true of many low-income women. Nor do we have jobs where the
"full-time" option requires working such long hours of overtime that we
rarely see our children awake, as is the case with many blue-collar workers
13
in unionized factory jobs' and many practicing professionals.' 14
Moreover, few tenured law professors face the depressing interaction
most women face: the demoralizing combination of inadequate child
care, a flawed system for delivering child services, and exploitative conditions on the job.115
1. Inadequate Child Care. - Said one working-class mother:
It's the best we can afford, but it's not great because she keeps
too many kids, and I know they don't get good attention. Especially the little one .... She's so clingy when I bring her home;
she can't let go of me, like nobody's paid her any mind all
day.

1 16

Even people who can pay high salaries have trouble. I suspect
we all know women who have quit in exhaustion after a long
succession of nannies. Alarmingly, studies have determined that
much of the child care available in the U.S. is "poor to mediocre."' 17 In fact, a national study exposed that one out of three
family child care programs in the U.S. is inadequate, i.e. poor
enough to actually harm child development. 1 18
2. Moms in Cars. - In France, well-baby care is delivered in
high-quality child care centers. In the U.S., parents (mostly
mothers) typically have to take time off from work, not only to
113. Id. at 80.
114. Id. at 71.
115. Joan Williams, Majority Rule?, Legal Times, Sept. 3, 2001, at 33.
116. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 154.
117. Children's Defense Fund, Child Care Basics, at http://www.childrensdefense.
org/cc.facts.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
118. Id.
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take kids to the doctor but to other enrichment activities that
play so large a part in middle-class life. The system of delivering
child services through moms in cars is punitive towards poor
families, and burdensome even on many middle-class families.
Said one secretary, "If you can afford the cut in pay for the
hours, the ideal situation would be to get home when they get
home from school, 3 P.M., so you can take them to ballet and
-Boy Scouts."' 19 A recent study of families in a wide range of
income levels found that one of the most frequent reasons par120
ents took time off from work was to provide transportation.
3. Exploitative Working Conditions. - Going to work is no
picnic for many women. High-status workers face glass ceiling
problems; women of all classes face sexual harassment and the
maternal wall. 12 1 What is the point of knocking oneself out, and
penalizing one's kids to boot, when work seems an uphill battle?
(Note that in this context, the persistence of sex discrimination
reinforces the notion that women are not serious workers,
thereby providing the rationale for further sex discrimination.)
This is the social context of most women's lives. These social conditions are combined with gender performance norms that define men in
terms of their ability to succeed at work, and women as people who
should have "all the time and love in the world to give" to their
22
children.
In view of all this, it is hard to be judgmental about which women are
making the "right choices," and it is simply not convincing to say that
employer 23behavior is the sole social force constructing women's
"choices."'
The crucial point-politically, strategically, and ethicallyis that a variety of different social forces feed into the choices made by
women, including not only employer behavior but also the lack of social
supports for childrearing and gender performance norms. We need not
adopt a simplistic model that employer behavior alone creates women's
"choices." We need only point out that every choice currently available is
deeply flawed, and that an employer who defines the ideal worker as
someone who takes no time off for childbirth or childrearing is defining
119. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 34.
120. Jody Heymann, The Widening Gap: Why America's Working Families Are in
Jeopardy and What Can Be Done About It 190 (2000).
121. Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 73, at 1687; see also
Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 69 (defining glass ceiling practices as
"different treatment of men and women with respect to job assignments that lead to
advancement, initial placement in relatively dead-end jobs, and lack of mentoring for
women").

122. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 2, at 30; see also Diane Kobrynowicz &
Monica Biernat, Decoding Stbjective Evaluations: How Stereotypes Provide Shifting
Standards, 33J. Experimental Soc. Psych. 579, 584-87 (1997) ("A 'Good Mother' [is] more
likely than a 'Good Father' to be described as willing to always be there and to do anything
for the children ...." (italics omitted)).
123. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 1, at 1904.
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"IT'S SNOWING DOWN SOUTH"

his work ideals around the bodies and life patterns of men in a manner
that systematically discriminates against women.
CONCLUSION

According to the biographer of the thirty-sixth president of the
United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson was often cruel to his wife Lady
Bird. He routinely humiliated her in public contexts, saying things like,
"It's snowing down South"-the old-fashioned phrase used to tell some1 24
one her slip was showing.
When I was growing up, I worried not only about my slip but also
about my bra. At the age of ten, I remember apprehensively asking my
best friend (who was far more socially adept than I): "What do you do if
you are out with a boy and you find your bra strap showing?" 'Just make a
joke of it," she said. "Say: 'I'm going to be a Playboy bunny."'
In some ways women's dress has changed very little; in other ways it
has changed a lot. Girls and women no longer feel they will be humiliated if a slip or a bra "shows." How did we solve that problem? We
stopped apologizing for who we are. If your sports bra is designed to
show, anyone who tries to humiliate you because it is showing is just
weird.
It is time we used the same strategy for motherhood. For forty years
we have tried to paper it over, to hide it, and to deny it. This enabled
people to discredit and humiliate (not to mention impoverish) us whenever our motherhood showed through.
The time has come to stop trying to hide, to stop trying to pass. No
woman should be compelled to do care work. But most women end up
doing a lot of it. Penalizing them for doing so is sex discrimination.
124. Interview by Daniel Zwerdling with Jan Jarboe Russell, biographer of Claudia
"Ladybird" Johnson, on All Things Considered, National Public Radio (Aug. 22, 1999).
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